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Hazout: The Semantic Interpretation of Unconditionals

The Semantic Interpretation
of Unconditionals
ILAN HAZOUT

1.

Introduction

This paper will be concerned with the semantic
interpretation of sentences such as in (1):
(1)

a. Whatever Mary wears, she looks pretty.
b. Whoever comes in we (will) remain seated.
c. However rich Mary might be, John will not marry
her.
d. Wherever you go, you will always have to pay
taxes.

The sentences in (1) all consist of two parts: a
main clause ("she looks pretty" in (la» and an "unconditional clause" headed by WH-ever preceding it. This
order is in fact not essential to the construction and
an unconditional clause can also follow the main clause
as in the following examples.
(2)

a. Mary looks pretty, whatever she wears.
b. We (will) remain seated, whoever comes in.
c. John will not marry Mary, however rich she
might be.
d. You will always have to pay taxes, wherever you
go.
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The main feature of the interpretation of these
sentences has to do with the conditional relationship
between the meaning of an adverbial clause headed by
"WH-ever" and the meaning of the main clause. In particular, such sentences are interpreted as claiming the
truth of the proposition expressed by the main clause
independently (or "unconditionally") of the choice of
any particular value for the variable represented (or
bound) by the WH-phrase in the adverbial clause.
Following Zaefferer (1987) I will refer to such adverbial phrases as unconditional clauses.
Let us first try to clarify what an unconditional
interpretation is. Consider example (3).
(3)

Wherever John lives, he will always have to pay
taxes.

(3) has at least the two following readings. The
first reading may be paraphrased as follows: "In the
place in which John lives he will always have to pay
taxes". Such an interpretation may be intended in a
situation Where a certain place was mentioned in previous discourse, the name of which the speaker does not
remember at the moment of utterance. Under a second
interpretation a statement is made about a conditional
relationship between John's living somewhere and John's
having to pay taxes, namely, a statement is made that
such a relationship does not exist, that is, John will
have to pay taxes wherever he lives. The following
examples may serve as a further illustration.
(4)

a. Whoever wins the election I will invite for
dinner.
b. Whoever wins the election, the situation will
be bad.

The sentence in (4a) talks about the specific, or
unique, winner of the election whose identity is not
known at the moment of utterance. That person will be
invited for dinner. The interpretation of (4b) on the
other hand is radically different. (4b) makes the
claim that a certain relationship holds between two
entities that are propositional in nature, namely, the
proposition that the situation will be bad, on the one
hand, and "Whoever wins the election" on the other.
Obviously, we will have to clarify in what sense this
second entity is propositional. However, it is not
hard to see what the minimal difference between (4a)
and (4b) is. Whereas in (4a) an NP free relative (FR)
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is related by syntactic movement to a gap in the main
clause, such a relationship does not exist in (4b).
Thus, if the FR in (4a) was related to the same position in the main clause with only the difference that
that position was occupied by a pronoun instead of a
gap, the interpretation indicated for (4a) would not be
available and the only possible interpretation would be
the unconditional one as demonstrated by (5).
(5)

Whoever wins the election, I will invite him for
dinner.

(5) says that the person who wins the election
will be invited for dinner regardless of who it is.
Thus, whereas the pronoun occupying the object position
of "invite" in the main clause is anaphorically related
to the subject position "of win the elections" in the
unconditional clause, the FR in (4b) is related to that
object position by movement, that is, it is an argument
of the verb. If this observation is supposed to lead
to any generalization, we would expect that the same
fact would hold for unmoved FRs in argument positions.
This is certainly true for the following example, to be
compared with (5).
(6) I will invite whoever wins the election for dinner.
This seems to be true also for FR's figuring as
subjects (7a) or objects of prepositions (7b).
(7)

a. Whoever wins the election will raise taxes.
b. They will talk with whoever is willing to talk
with them.

Thus, it seems that for a constituent to be interpreted as an unconditional clause it must not be
related to an argument position in the main clause,
either by occupying such a position or by being moved
from it.
Let us summarize the two main observations presented above. Our first observation concerned a distinction between two types of interpretation available
for phrases headed by WH-ever. The first, the "unconditional" interpretation, will be the main interest of
this paper. The second is the regular interpretation
available for any constituent type, either headed by
WH-ever or not. Given this distinction, we then
observed that the unconditional interpretation is not
available for a "WH-ever phrase" which is syntactically
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related to an argument position. It is possible that a
syntactic account could be provided for this observation. Such an account could simply consist of indicating that, given the nature of the unconditional
interpretation, such an interpretation could only be
assigned to sentential constituents. It would then
follow that phrases which must be construed as NP's (or
other category types) subcategorized for by a verb
cannot qualify for this kind of interpretation. since
this question is basically syntactic in nature no
attempt will be made to resolve it here. Rather, the
main interest of this paper will be the nature and
derivation of the unconditional interpretation.
2.

The discourse function of unconditionals

An important notion that, as I will try to show,
is central to the analysis of unconditionals is the one
of conversational background. This notion is related
to What has been referred to in the literature as
"common ground", "speaker presupposition" and possibly
other terms. As suggested by Stalnaker (1978) and Heim
(1982), the presuppositions of the speaker are the propositions whose truth he takes for granted as part of
the background of the conversation and which he assumes
that his audience believes or assumes to be true as
well. One may assume that in an ideal communication
situation there is a certain set of presuppositions
that are shared by all participants. This is the
common ground of a context. Assuming a possible worlds
framework, a set of speaker's presuppositions may be
defined as a set of all and only possible worlds which
are compatible with everything that the speaker presupposes. Such a set of possible worlds is referred to by
Stalnaker (J.978) as the "context set." The effect of
an assertion made in a conversation situation is to
reduce the context set in a particular way. Assuming
the willingness of the audience to accept the assertion, a new context set is created by eliminating all
the possible worlds that are incompatible with the proposition asserted. It is assumed by Stalnaker that a
proposition asserted is always true in some but not all
of the possible worlds in the context set. This follows if one assumes that a speaker does not felicitously assert something which is already presupposed (that
is, true in all the worlds of the context set). ThUS,
the effect of a felicitous assertion is always a reduction of the context set.
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It will be seen later in this paper how the notion
of conversational background can be integrated into a
more general theory of conditional modality, but given
this notion as presented so far, a simple conditional
as in (8) may help to illustrate the interaction of
unconditionals with the conversational background.
(8)

If I scratch this match, then it will light.

Given normal circumstances, in particular, circumstances in which this match is dry and not wet, the
conditional in (8) would be normally taken to be true.
That is, given a certain set of implicit background
assumptions and the antecedent clause "I scratch this
match," the consequent "it will light" is claimed to
follow.
The conditional statement made in the following
example is clearly different:
(9)

If I scratch this match and it is wet, then it
will light.

In (9) the assumption of normal circumstances in
which matches are dry is explicitly denied. (9) certainly does not follow from (8). It makes a different
statement. Consider now the following unconditional:
(10) Whichever match I scratch, it will light.
Assuming that by "whichever match" one means to
include any kind of matches, including both wet and
dry, then, among other claims, it makes also the one
that the match will light even if it is wet. A background assumption as to normal circumstances in which
matches are dry is not explicitly denied, but it is
clear that such an assumption is not made. Rather, the
proposition expressed by the main clause ("it [the
match] will light") is asserted to be true regardless
of what kind of match (wet or dry) is scratched. That
is, as far as the background is concerned, no assumption is made with respect to this particular detail.
One may say that the background is free to vary over
all possible values with respect to this parameter.
The important observation that the interpretation
of unconditional clauses is associated with this particular discourse mechanism of "opening the background"
was first made by Zaefferer (1987). It is this observation that will serve as our point of departure. Our
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task in this paper will be to demonstrate how it can be
derived from a general theory of conditional modality.
One may relate the above observations to the fact
that unconditional sentences are easily paraphrasable
as even-if conditionals, as in the following pair:
(11) a. However tall John is, he will be a great
basketball player.
b. Even if he is short, John will be a great
basketball player.
Given a set of background assumptions which includes the one that in order to be a basketball player,
being tall is normally a required condition, an unconditional such as (lla) can be paraphrased as in (lIb),
since (lla) is understood as a rejection of such a
background assumption. Clearly (lla) does not claim
that if John was tall, he would be a great basketball
player. Rather, what it claims is that whether or not
he will be a great basketball player does not depend on
how tall he is.
Thus, assuming a certain pragmatic scale varying
over the property of "being tall" and which goes from
the value "very tall" all the way down to "short", then
our average real world knowledge includes the assumption that a certain value within this scale has to be
assigned to a person in order for that person to be
able to become a great basketball player. However, as
soon as any assumptions with respect to this scale are
rejected as irrelevant, it is immediately implied that
one can go all the way down on this scale and the proposition expressed by the main clause ("John will be a
great basketball player") will still be true.
Given this view of the implicational relation
between (lla) and (llbj and assuming the same kind of
background knowledge, in particular an assumption such
as "If a person is (very) small then he can never be a
great basketball player", then a reversed implication
such as in (12) is expected:
(12) a. However tall John is, he will never be a great
basketball player.
b. Even if he is very tall, John will never be a
great basketball player.
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A detailed analysis of how the interpretation of
unconditionals is derived will be attempted in the
following sections.
3.

Unconditionals and conditionals

In trying to develop a semantic analysis of unconditionals, I will first indicate why and how such an
analysis should differ from the analysis of regular
conditionals.
In presenting the data in Section 1 we noted the
difference between FR's occupying an argument position
inside the main clause and WH-constituents that function as unconditional clauses and are not syntactically
related to any argument position. We observed the contrast between pairs such as the following:
(13) a. Whoever violates the law will go to jail.
b. Whoever violates the law, he will go to jail.
Assuming the framework developed by Lewis (1975)
and Heim (1982), among others, a logical representation
of (l3a) would be a tripartite structure which looks
roughly as follows:
(14)

~

x violates the law

x goes to jail

In this representation, the "propositional function" derived from the FR serves as a restrictive
clause while the "propositional function" derived from
the matrix clause by extracting the FR from it serves
as a nuclear scope. The subject-FR is understood as
universally quantified, therefore the universal
operator. The interpretation of logical forms such as
this one is such that for the sentence to come out
true, it must be the case that every value assignment
which satisfies the restrictive clause also satisfies
the nuclear scope.
(13a) is identical in meaning to (15a) and (lSb).
(15) a. Every person who violates the law will go to
jaiL
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b. If a person violates the law, he will go to
jail.
The logical form of (15a,b) is basically identical
to (14) except for the maximally general additional
condition that "x is a person", a condition which
changes nothing with respect to the truth value of
(15a,b). (16) would be the logical form that incorporates this additional condition.
(16)

s

X 1.S a person
x violates the law

x will go to jail

In both (14) and (16), the variable x is directly quantified over. The logical formulae corresponding to
(14,16) will be (17a) and (17b), respectively.
(17) a. vx [violates the law(x)] [will go to jail (x)]
b. Vx [person(x) & violates the law(x)] [will go
to jail (x)]
There is a subtle but still visible difference in
meaning between (13b) (the unconditional) on the one
hand, and (13a) and (15a,b) on the other, namely, in
(13b) the sense of generality and exceptionlessness is
stronger than it is in the other three forms. There
are. however, examples in which the contrast between a
conditional and an unconditional is much clearer. (The
following pairs are from Zaefferer (1987».
(18) a. If we pay him something. Max does his job.
b. Whatever we pay him. Max does his job.
(19) a. If she wears something. Amanda looks pretty.
b. Whatever she wears. Amanda looks pretty.
The (a) and the (b) members of the pairs above
differ clearly in truth conditions. Whereas in the unconditionals (b) the proposition expressed by the main
clause is claimed to be true. this is not the case in
the (a) sentences. In these examples only a conditio,lal relationship is claimed to hold between the main
clause and its antecedent. Given our framework. the
(a) examples will be assigned the usual logical form as
indicated for previous examples (16). If the same
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logical form is assigned to (~8b) and (~9b), the question that arises immediately is how this difference in
meaning can be accounted for. In the next pages I will
try to provide an analysis of unconditionals which will
be in conformity with the general analysis of conditionals. In this analysis, unconditionals are limited
to tripartite structures in which modals function as
operators. The difference in meaning between conditionals and unconditionals is derived, on this view,
from the different way in which these logical forms are
semantically interpreted. Such an analysis of unconditionals will be shown to follow from a general theory
of modality. In particular, I will make use of the
theory of conditional modality as developed by Kratzer
(~979, ~987).
I will therefore proceed first to a
somewhat detailed presentation of Kratzer's theory of
modality.
4.

A theory of conditional modality

In the framework of possible worlds semantics, a
proposition is defined as the set of possible worlds in
which it is true. Given such a conception we may think
about worlds in terms of the sets of propositions that
are true in those worlds. We can further use these
notions to give a model theoretic definition of what
was referred to earlier as the conversational background. In these terms, a conversational background is
just a function from possible worlds to sets of propositions. A further step along these lines consists of
a distinction between different kinds of conversational
backgrounds, accounting for the different meanings a
modal (explicit or implicit) can have. For example, a
modal like "must" can have (among others) a deontic, an
epistemic, or a preferential meaning, as exemplified in
(20-22).
(20) Deontic:
Soldiers must obey their orders (in view of
what is legally prescribed)
(2~)

Epistemic:
It must be hot on the surface of the sun (in
view of what is known)

(22) Preferential:
We must have that hat (in view of what our
preferences are)
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Thus, a deontic conversational background consists of a
certain set of propositions which define a certain
moral code or legal system. In our terms, a deontic
conversational background is a function H which assigns
to each world a set of propositions defining a moral
code or a legal system in that world. The same would
apply for all other sorts of conversational background.
Modals in this theory specify some logical relation between the proposition which is the meaning of
the sentence which they modify and the set of propositions of which the background consists (the set of propositions assigned to a world W by H). For example,
~ specifies a relation of logical consequence.
Thus, (20) is true in a world W if the proposition;
"witnesses swear to tell the truth" follows logically
from the set of propositions assigned to that world by
the function H, interpreted deontically. The kind of
conversational background involved in the interpretation of a sentence may be either implicitly or explicitly stated. Things get a little bit more complex
when it comes to modal conditionals such as (23) (with
a deontic conversational background).
(23) If they are convicted, defendants must appear in
court for sentencing.
In this case, it is the union of the antecedent
clause with the conversational background which is
relevant. HoweVer, given that the relationship between
the set resulting from this union and the proposition
expressed by the main clause is that of logical consequence, one must be careful about what the resulting
union set is. In particular, if the resulting set is
inconsistent, anything will follow from it. since this
part of Kratzer's theory will turn out to be crucial
for the analysis of unconditionals, I will illustrate
it with the following example. Suppose that a deontic
conversational background consists of the propositions
in (24).
(24) a. No one serves as captain of an oil tanker while
drunk.
b. Anyone serving as captain of an oil tanker
while drunk loses his license.
Given a conditional with the antecedent clause in
(25) below, since (25) is inconsistent with (24a), any
of the propositions in (26), if used as the consequent

I
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clause of (25), will follow from the union of (24) and
(25) •
(25) If John serves as captain of an oil tanker while
drunk
(26) a. he must lose his license
b. he must not lose his license
c. his license must be displayed at the national
gallery
d. he must be distinct from himself.
Clearly, this is an undesirable result. To solve this
problem, Kratzer proposes to adjust the interpretation
of modal conditionals in the following way: Consider a
scheme such as (27) representing a modal conditional
with mY£t as its modal verb and with p and q being the
propositions expressed by 51 and 52 respectively.
(27) If 51 must 52
Given a set of propositions A serving as the conversational backqround for (27), then must specifies that q
should follow from every maximal consistent subset of
the union of A and p, (A U (p» which includes p.
Applied to our example, since (24a) and (25) are inconsistent, the only maximal consistent subset of the
union of (24) and (25) will be the one including (24b)
and (25) from which only (26a) follows logically, so
that the conditional (28) will come out true.
(28) If John drives down a one-way street the wrong
way, he must lose his license.
For a modal like "can", the analoqous requirement would
be that q should be compatible with the set of all
maximal consistent subsets of (A U (p» which include
p, that is, it should follow from at least one of them.
5tump (1985) applies this theory of modality to the
semantic analysis of free adjuncts and develops some
useful notation.
For sentences in which a modal is unaccompanied by
a conditional clause, so that the sentence is interpreted relative to a certain conversational background,
a function C is assumed which takes as input a constant
of type <s,«s,t>,t» which denotes the conversational
background and qives as output the set of all its consistent subsets, that is, a constant of type
<s,«<s,t>,t>,t». C is thus a constant of type
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«s,«s,t>,t»,<s,«<s,t>,t>,t»>. A modal is a function which takes as its two arguments the output of C
«s,«<s,t>,t>,t») and a proposition <s,t> and yields
a truth value.
Thus, the modal mY§t is a function of type
«s,«<s,t>,t>,t»,«s,t>,t» which gives the truth
value 1 if for any proposition p and any set S of
maximal consistent subsets s, p follows from S for
every SES. A modal like ggn would be defined in an
analogous way.
For the case of conditional modals a function 0 is
assumed which takes as its input a constant of type
<s,«s,t>,t» denoting the conversational background
and a proposition and yields the set of all consistent
subsets of these two which include the given proposition. Thus, 0 is a constant of type
«s,«s,t>,t»,«s,t>,<s,«<s,t>,t>,t»». Given these
formalisms, the sentences in (29a) and (30a) will be
translated as in (29b) and (30b) respectively (where cb
stands for the conversational background) .
(29) a. John must writ~ his paper.
b. Must (C(cb» (John writes his paper)
(30) a. If John has enough money, he can buy this car.
b. Can (D(cb) (John has enough money» (He buys
this car).
5.

The interpretation of unconditionals

Coming finally to the analysis of unconditionals,
the first thing to note is that unconditional clauses
are incorporated into the overall interpretation just
like if-clauses and free adjuncts. Thus, the truth
functional import of the whole expression is evaluated
with respect to the union of the set of background
assumptions A and p, with the difference that p in this
case is a universally quantified expression of the
form: "Fx". Everything in the interpretation of unconditionals follows from this difference. One problematic issue needs to be mentioned before we present the
interpretation mechanism. On the analysis of unconditionals proposed here, their interpretation always
involves the conversational background in the precise
sense defined earlier. As "concrete objects" figuring
in a semantic representation, conversational backgrounds are arguments of operators, in particular,

https://scholarworks.umass.edu/umop/vol16/iss2/3

12

Hazout: The Semantic Interpretation of Unconditionals

ILAN HAZOUT

37

modal operators. It is only in this way that they can
fit into well formed semantic representations such as,
for example, the ones given in (29b) and (30b). However, examples of unconditional sentences which have no
overt modal operator are not too hard to find. (la),
repeated here as (31), is one such example.
(31) Whatever Mary wears, she looks pretty.
It will therefore be necessary to assume that unconditional sentences such as (31) always involve an implicit modal operator of some sort. As to the actual
mechanism of interpretation, the semantic representation of the unconditional clause which serves as input
to the function 0 is an expression of the form "Fx".
For example, the unconditional clause in (32a) is
translated as in (32b).
(32) a. However tall John is, he will never be a great
basketball player.
b. [John is x tall).
Given a conversational background, the question is
now how a set of maximal consistent subsets including
(32) is formed. The notion of consistency for a set of
propositions A and a set of worlds w is defined in
Kratzer (1979) as follows.
(33) consistency: A set of propositions A is consistent if and only if there is a world weW such that
all propositions of A are true in W. otherwise, A
is inconsistent.
The above definition of consistency makes use of
the notion of truth which is defined as follows:
(34) Truth of a proposition: A proposition P is true
in a world weW if and only if wePt otherwise, P is
false in w.
Obviously, the notion of consistency is only
defined for propositions. To see how an expression
such as in (32b) can be incorporated into the background, in order for a set of maximal consistent subset
to be formed, some additional machinery will be needed.
Assuming a domain of quantification 0 to be a contextually relevant set, then given a domain 0, we can
define a set pI of propositions, as follows.
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(35)

pl= {pl3deD

&

[p=

[I

r/J 11d/X] }

Assuming the definitions formulated above, no
additional adjustments are needed with respect to the
definition of the function 0 (not to be confused with
the domain D). Thus, 0 operates on its arguments as
represented in the following expression.
(36) 0 (cb) ( p)
Given that p in our case is the propositional
function Fx (the translation of the unconditional
clause), with x in the scope of a universal quantifier
(signaled, or represented, in English by the morpheme
"-ever"), the fUnction 0 applies for each one of p'eP',
thus exhausting the contextually given domain D.
The output of the operation in (36) (for p=Fx) is
a set S of maximal consistent subsets seS such that
(for some S') S=SIU{pl} for all plePI.
To illustrate, consider example (32). p is the
expression given in (32b). The set pI corresponding to
p ([John is x tall]) is the set of propositions Pl,P2"
••• Pn as follows.
(37) pll: John is 4 feet tall
P'2: John is 5 feet tall

"
II
II

P'n: John is n feet tall
Thus, for any subset of the set of propositions
given by the background to be consistent with [John is
x tall], it must form a union set with each one of
plt ••••• P·n such that each one of the resulting sets is
consistent. Note now that if no assumption with
respect to John's height is included in the conversational background, then no inconsistency arises. HoWever, if there is in the conversational background an
assumption with respect to John's height, for example:
"John is 6 feet tall", then, given that it is impossible for a person to be both x feet tall and y feet
tall, (for x~y), at one and the same time, this assumption will be inc.onsistent with all the propositions in
P' except for one. Therefore, it does not figure in
any of the sets seS except for one. It is this computational mechanism that gives rise to the special
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effect of "opening the background", associated with
unconditionals.
Moving one step further, a modal operator in an
unconditional sentence defines a relationship between
the output of the function D and the proposition Q
expressed by the main clause (as in (29b), (30b».
Given the set of maximal consistent subsets S which is
the output of D, a modal like mY§t imposes the requirement that Q logically follow from all SES: As was said
before, for all SES there is some p'EP' such that p'ES.
Thus, all the sets SES are identical except for P'iEP'
which figures as a member of each one of them. The
propositions PEP' were defined as the set of propositions of the form Fal, Fa2 .••• Fan, with the set of constants a l , a2, ••.. a n , denoting each and all of the
individuals in a contextually relevant domain D. Thus,
for Q to follow from seS its truth must not depend on
the denotation of any of a l , a2, an. That is, as far as
any particular value in the relevant domain D is concerned, Q must be true. It is by this mechanism that
the particular "unconditional" interpretation of these
constructions is derived.
6.

Conversational backgrounds, modal operators and
Logical Form

In view of the analysis presented above, in particular the proposal that unconditional clauses function
as arguments of operators, two issues need to be discussed. First, it might be expected that unconditional
clauses would be interpretable equally well with all
types of conversational backgrounds. This seems to be
fairly unproblematic. The following examples illustrate unconditional clauses interacting with deontic,
epistemic and preferential conversational backgrounds,
respectively.
(38) (Deontic) Whoever comes in, you must remain
seated.
(39) (Epistemic) Whatever you find in that drawer, it
must belong to John.
(40) (Preferential) However expensive it might be, I
must have this book.
Note that (38) is in fact ambiguous between (at
least) a preferential and a deontic reading. Thus, a
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deontic reading is relevant under circumstances in
which a certain requirement or obligation to have the
book is imposed on the speaker. We also find examples
that show ambiguity between an epistemic and a deontic
interpretation.
(41) Whoever teaches in this department must have
received a Ph.D.
One also finds acceptable cases of unconditionals
cooccurring with the existential modal "may". The following is such an example in which the modal operator
is most naturally interpreted deontically.
(42) Whoever comes in, you may remain seated.
The discussion in the previous sections of this
paper concentrated on the semantic interpretation of
these constructions. It was assumed, however, that at
the level of Logical Form unconditional clauses are
represented in conformity with the general analysis of
conditionals. Within such a framework unconditionals
are represented as tripartite structures in which
modals function as operators. Given this approach, we
assume the basic logical form for an unconditional sentence, with the modal "must", to be a configuration
such as the following:
(43)

s
Clause]

In this configuration the propositional function Fx,
representing the unconditional clause, figures as a restrictive clause. It is also assumed that in the basic
case of (43) a universal operator is implicit in the
interpretation of the modal "must". A universal
operator is always involved in the interpretation of an
unconditional. It is assumed that the morpheme "-ever"
serves as a signal to this effect. Given this
approach, we may attribute to (41) the following LF
configuration.
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(44)

MU~
x teaches
in this dept.

x has rece1ved
a Ph.D.

In such a representation, the possibilities
(necessity, in this case) are claimed in terms of the
values of the restrictive clause (x teaches in this
department).
However, (41) may also have an interpretation in which necessity is claimed in terms of each
particular value (roughly: for all x, if x teaches in
this department, then, given certain regulations, i t
must be the case that x has received a Ph.D.). A
representation of such a reading could look like (45)
in which one tripartite structure is embedded inside
the other.

s

(45)
x eac es 1n
this dept.
Must

x has rece1ved
a Ph.D.
In this configuration a universal quantifier figures
explicitly as an operator with the unconditional clause
as its restrictor.
The restrictive clause for the
modal operator would consist of background assumptions
specifying a certain set of regUlations (university
regUlations in this case).
Note now that, given the
two possible configurations above, only (45) would be
available for unconditionals with an existential modal
(e.g. "may") since such a modal is incompatible with an
implicit universal operator. Accordingly, one expects
to find cases for which it is arguable that such a
modal statement is incompatible with the restriction by
the unconditional clause. The following (due, like
much of the discussion in this section, to B.H. Partee)
is possibly an example of such a case.
(46)

*Whatever you find in that drawer, it may belong
to John.
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Relevance and the conversational background
Consider the following example:

(47) Whenever you come to the restaurant, we will serve
you.
As was noted above, adverbial clauses headed by WH-ever
are free to have both the unconditional and the regular
adverbial interpretation. We will concentrate here on
the unconditional reading, which seems to be the more
salient. The interpretation of (47) implies an assumption on the part of the speaker that there is normally
some connection of relevance between the time of the
day and whether or not a person will be served. That
is, given normal background assumptions, food is served
in the restaurant only during certain hours. As
Kratzer (1979) notes, generalizing her own statement, a
conversational background (in the precise sense assumed
here), reflects in a certain way the assumptions which
are relevant in the situation of utterance. ThUS, let
us assume the following conversational background for
(47) •
(48) a. If a person comes to the restaurant during
opening hOUrs, he will be served.
b. A person comes to the restaurant during opening
hours.
Note that, given this background, the following modal
conditional is true as predicted by our mechanism,
since none of the propositions conflicts with its antecedent clause.
(49) If John comes to the restaurant during opening
hours, he will be served.
I would like to claim that (48) is also the conversational background relevant for (47). In this case, the
proposition with respect to which consistency is
checked is the following:
(47' )

[you come at x] (for x ranging over times).

Given our mechanism, (48b) is eliminated from all of
the resulting maximal consistent subsets, but (48a),
the general conditional statement, is not. This kind
of effect is more striking in examples such as the
following.
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(50) However tall you are, you will make a good cook.
(51) Whoever is elected president of the U.S.A, there
is going to be a tornado in Florida.
(50) implies an assumption made by the speaker that how
tall a person is is somehow relevant for the property
of being a good cook. That is, there is an implicit
conditional such as: "If a person is tall to such and
such a degree, he is a good cook". (50) is interpreted
in such a way that such a conditional still holds,
except that it does not hold with respect to the person
to which (50) is addressed.
In (51) again, the (I assume) absurd assumption is
made by the speaker that the identity of the president
of the U.S.A. is somehow relevant to whether or not
there will be a tornado in Florida. ThUS, (51) has in
its background a proposition such as: "If a certain
(type of) person is the president of the U.S.A., then
there is a tornado in Florida." This conditional
assumption remains in the background. But any assumption with respect to any specific person x such as, "x
is the president of the U.S.A" is eliminated.
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Appendix : Unconditionals in Hebrew and the Syntax
of Unconditionals
Unconditional constructions in Hebrew are identical to their English counterparts in most relevant
respects. However, it seems to me that the problem of
their correct syntactic analysis can be better illustrated with the Hebrew data. Before going into this
question it would be useful to mention one important
fact. Note that in English the morpheme -ever is
obligatory in an unconditional clause in order for it
to fulfill this particular function. The absence of
-ever results in ungrammaticality unless the clause
from which it is missing can be construed with an argument position in the main clause. As for Hebrew, to
signal the function of a constituent as an unconditional clause it makes use of the negation word 10
(not).
(1)

mi Se
*(10) yenatseax babxirot
who that *(not) will win in the election
matsav
situation

yihye
will be

hathe

ra
bad

"Whoever wins the election, the situation will be
bad."
As can be seen from the translation above, (1) contains
no negation in its interpretation. This use of negation is traditionally referred to as "pleonastic
negation".
Coming back to our main issue, except for the
obligatoriness of the negation 10, Hebrew unconditional
clauses are identical in their surface appearance to
FRs of all category types. The examples in (2-3)
illustrate identical sequences figuring as unconditional clauses (a), as FRs moved out of an argument
position in the main clause (b), or as occupying that
position (c). As one may see, the difference of function of the same sequences is correlated with a different interpretation of the negation word 10.
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a. ma
*(5e)
Dan 10 yikne
ze yihye
what *fthatl Dan not will buy it will be
yakar
expensive
"Whatever Dan buys, it will be expensive."
b. ma
*(5el
Dan 10 yikne
what *lthat) Dan not will buy

Dina tikne
Dina will buy

"What (ever) Dan will not buy, Dina will buy."
c. Dina
Dina

tikne
ma
*(5e)
Dan
will buy what *Cthat) Dan

10 yikne
not will buy

"Dina will buy what Dan will not buy."
(3)

a. im
mi
*(5e)
Dan 10 yedaber
hu
with whom *lthat) Dan not will talk he
yargiS
meSu'amam
will feel bored
"Whoever Dan will talk to, he will feel bored."
b. im
mi
*fSel
Dan 10 yedaber
Dina
with whom *(that) Dan not will talk Dina
tedaber
will talk
"Dina will talk with those who Dan will not
talk to."
c. Dina tedaber
Dina will talk

im
mi
*(S9)
Dan 10
with whom *(thatl Dan not

yedaber
will talk
"Dina will talk with those who Dan will not
talk to."
As the examples above show, the occurrence of the complementizer ~ is obligatory both for unconditional
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clauses and for FRs. The occurrence of ~ is typical
also for restrictive relatives in Hebrew.
(4)

ha-sefer
the book

Se
tikne
that you will buy

~

is also obligatory in non-WH sentential complements
(5) as opposed to interrogative complements (6). (OM =
Object Marker).
(5)

Dan orner *(Se)
hu kara et
Dan says *(that) he read OM

ha-sefer
the-book

(6)

Dan Sa'al mi (*Se)
kara et ha-sefer
Dan asked who (*that) read OM the book

Thus, with respect to the distribution of the complementizer Se, unconditional clauses pattern like
relative clauses and unlike WH-sentential complements.
The distribution facts in (2-3) would also support a
view of unconditional clauses as FRs (possibly headed
by a nominal or a prepositional WH-element, respectively). Viewing unconditional clauses as sentential would
immediately raise the question as to the contrast with
the sentential complements in (6). Whereas in (6) the
cooccurrence of a WH word with Se (presumably the head
of COMP) is strictly prohibited, exactly the opposite
is true of unconditionals, as demonstrated in (2-3).
However, viewing unconditional clauses as syntacticallY
sentential would certainly be preferable given the
facts about their interpretation and their formal
analysis presented in this paper. It is certainly
desirable to maintain a certain correlation between
syntactic and semantic categories. However, it is hard
to see how the restrictions on the distribution of ~
could be correlated with the semantic function of unconditionals. It is possible that these facts, in particular the contrast between unconditionals and sentential WH-complements, would follow from some adequate
theory of the structure of COMP and a particular
analysis of the structure of COMP in Hebrew.
One might
wonder whether such an analysis is feasible, relating
the syntactic and the semantic facts in a way which
would be more than just a statement of the facts.
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